The sentence:
A fox is a scavenger.
represents no cognitive challenge, with the ‘A fox’ being the subject of the sentence and ‘is a scavenger’ being the predicate. The subject is at least one or else all members of a class (particular v universal) which the predicate tells us something about. There are also singular statements where an assertion is made about a specifically named person or thing: Mr. Tod is a fox. Reversing the subject and predicate does pose a cognitive challenge:
A scavenger is a fox.
The problem here is that we have defined a broader term with a narrower one, which jars immediately. Needless to say, it is the freak sentences that keep the mind buzzing.
The sentence: Mr. Tod is a fox, translates into the language of FOL (first order logic) simply as: Fj. The sentence: A fox is Mr. Tod, requires an existential quantifier and goes into symbols as: (∃x)(Fx • x = t), where ‘t’ stands for Mr. Tod. This sentence is very, very weak. It says that there exists an individual such that it is a fox and it is called Mr. Tod. An example of a credible sentence is wanting, and any suggestions are welcome.
The definite description: The fox is Mr. Tod, requires a more robust translation: (∃x)]Fx • (y)(Fy ⊃ y = x) • x = t], and says that there is exactly one fox that is called Mr. Tod. As an example of immediate application, I can, for example, ask a friend about the fellow who came to last night’s fancy dress party dressed as a fox, and be told that the fox was Mr. Tod.
This frivolous what-is-what dilemma was prompted by a sentence I heard on the news:
The interests of the country are the priority.
When compared with: The priority is the interests of the country, the difference is as between: Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens, and Samuel Clemens was Mark Twain, there being no apparent difference at all. Identity is commutative, so the sentences are equivalent.
Identity aside, what would it take for the A scavenger is a fox sentence not to cause a dissonance? It seems to me that when we put the extensional rather than intentional spin on a sentence, we can convince ourselves that it sounds OK. The intentional definition of a scavenger is ‘an animal that eats anything it can find’. The extensional definition lists examples: foxes, rats, crows, and so on. Thus:
A scavenger is a fox, for example.
is perfectly well-formed. On paper (on screen) the trick was accomplished by tacking on ‘for example’, but in the head the ‘for examples’ can be dispensed with. At any rate, the mind resets itself from intentional to extensional mode even before the ‘for example’ is added. That the mind can reset itself like this can be gleaned from saying the sentence in quick succession many times: … is a fox is a scavenger is a fox is a scavenger is a fox is a scavenger is a fox is a scavenger is a … As the mind wanders from one to the other, the subject and predicate are in a state of indeterminacy.
A fox is a scavenger.
represents no cognitive challenge, with the ‘A fox’ being the subject of the sentence and ‘is a scavenger’ being the predicate. The subject is at least one or else all members of a class (particular v universal) which the predicate tells us something about. There are also singular statements where an assertion is made about a specifically named person or thing: Mr. Tod is a fox. Reversing the subject and predicate does pose a cognitive challenge:
A scavenger is a fox.
The problem here is that we have defined a broader term with a narrower one, which jars immediately. Needless to say, it is the freak sentences that keep the mind buzzing.
The sentence: Mr. Tod is a fox, translates into the language of FOL (first order logic) simply as: Fj. The sentence: A fox is Mr. Tod, requires an existential quantifier and goes into symbols as: (∃x)(Fx • x = t), where ‘t’ stands for Mr. Tod. This sentence is very, very weak. It says that there exists an individual such that it is a fox and it is called Mr. Tod. An example of a credible sentence is wanting, and any suggestions are welcome.
The definite description: The fox is Mr. Tod, requires a more robust translation: (∃x)]Fx • (y)(Fy ⊃ y = x) • x = t], and says that there is exactly one fox that is called Mr. Tod. As an example of immediate application, I can, for example, ask a friend about the fellow who came to last night’s fancy dress party dressed as a fox, and be told that the fox was Mr. Tod.
This frivolous what-is-what dilemma was prompted by a sentence I heard on the news:
The interests of the country are the priority.
When compared with: The priority is the interests of the country, the difference is as between: Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens, and Samuel Clemens was Mark Twain, there being no apparent difference at all. Identity is commutative, so the sentences are equivalent.
Identity aside, what would it take for the A scavenger is a fox sentence not to cause a dissonance? It seems to me that when we put the extensional rather than intentional spin on a sentence, we can convince ourselves that it sounds OK. The intentional definition of a scavenger is ‘an animal that eats anything it can find’. The extensional definition lists examples: foxes, rats, crows, and so on. Thus:
A scavenger is a fox, for example.
is perfectly well-formed. On paper (on screen) the trick was accomplished by tacking on ‘for example’, but in the head the ‘for examples’ can be dispensed with. At any rate, the mind resets itself from intentional to extensional mode even before the ‘for example’ is added. That the mind can reset itself like this can be gleaned from saying the sentence in quick succession many times: … is a fox is a scavenger is a fox is a scavenger is a fox is a scavenger is a fox is a scavenger is a … As the mind wanders from one to the other, the subject and predicate are in a state of indeterminacy.
And yet when you put 'The' at the front of the second sentence
ReplyDelete'The scavenger is a fox',
it doesn't jar at all. Maybe because the broader term is now qualified.