Thursday, 9 June 2011

The Logic Book, M. Bergmann, J. Moor, J. Nelson, McGraw Hill, 2004, 10.4E, 11(b), p. 559

We are asked to show that the following sentences are inconsistent: {(∃x)(Hx • Mxc); (x)(Lx ¬ Hx); (∃y)(Ly • Hy)}. In other words, we need to derive a contradiction. The thing to spot here is that we should start by instantiating the second of the existential statements (statement 3) and ignore the first. Otherwise we will not be able to instantiate statement 3 to the same constant as statement 2.
  1. (∃x)(Hx • Mxc)
  2. (x)(Lx ¬ Hx)
  3. (∃y)(Ly • Hy)
  4. La • Ha ......... 3 EI y/a
  5. La ......... 4 Simp.
  6. Ha ......... 4 Simp.
  7. La ¬ Ha ......... 2 UI x/a
  8. ¬ La ......... 6,7 MT
  9. ¬ La • La ......... 8,5 Conj.

Thursday, 2 June 2011

Conclusion before proof

Proofs of arguments in logic and mathematics differ from problem solving (except where the latter is used loosely and covers both situations) in that we know the answer in advance. The goal is to show that, given the information we have, and the rules we know, we can actually reach the stated conclusion.

Starting with the conclusion is not cheating. We often work backwards, from the conclusion to the premises, as far as we can go, in order to spot any clues that might help us pick up the threads when we reason in the conventional but often ineffective way. In some contexts, our success depends to a large extent on whether we can actually articulate the conclusion, and then translate it into a language we can work with.

If, for example, the task is to prove that the composition of an odd and even function is always even, and we are actually able to put down on paper what has just been said, we have as good as proved the theorem. In this case, we’d be looking at proving that f(g(x)) = f(-g(x)). The proof consists of only a few steps and relies entirely on the definition of an odd and even function.

Deductive reasoning is in fact an infinitesimally small part of all the reasoning that we do, but it sets standards that are worth emulating despite one failed attempt after another. The professions pride themselves on reasoning for a living. The professionals I teach take umbrage at me saying they don’t reason deductively (I review and proofread legal matter as part of my job), but I don’t mean it as criticism. What I criticize, and which strangely they find uncontroversial at all, is that they reason the wrong way round. If they reason at all.

Typically, legal advice will be frontloaded with facts, evidence, legislation and legal interpretations, plus some assumptions, all of which is to serve as the premises. Then, writing and thinking start and proceed at the same time. This part is usually called ‘analysis’. That’s where the problem lies. The analysis should have been done before. The writing stage should be where the outcome of the analysis is summarized, not the analysis per se.

These reports, analyses, research papers and legal opinions often lack any sort of conclusion – they concentrate on the trip, not on the destination. The numerous ‘howevers’ and ‘neverthelesses’ are ways of telling the reader how much the writer is enjoying the trip. The writer says: let’s toss the facts ‘in the instant case’ and my rhetoric and let’s see what pattern they form when they fall on paper. When I finish the writing, I will know the conclusion. You wait patiently.

‘To the extent that the strategy you pursue may be contended (and constructed) to fit within the parameters of the law, success in prevailing against a challenge based upon alleged noncompliance will be enhanced, but this office is not in a position to predict the odds of such a successful outcome,’ is a legitimate conclusion, but if I have to wade through 5 pages of legal meanderings to read this, I want my money back.

Wednesday, 1 June 2011

Symbolic Logic, D. Jacquette, Wadsworth, 2001, Chpt. 8, IV(18), p. 436

The argument:

"All giraffes are long-necked mammals of the African plains. Therefore, the tonsils of a giraffe are the tonsils of a long-necked mammal of the African plains."

The proof:
  1. (x)[Gx ⊃(Lx • Mx • Pxa)]
  2. (x)(y)[(Gy • Txy) ⊃ (∃z)(Lz • Mz • Pza • Txz)]
  3. * Gy • Txy ......... ACP
  4. * Gy ......... 3 Simp.
  5. * Gy ⊃(Ly • My • Pya) ......... 1 UI x/y
  6. * Ly • My • Pya ......... 4,5 MP
  7. * Txy ......... 3 Simp.
  8. * Ly • My • Pya • Txy ......... 6,7 Conj.
  9. * (∃z)(Lz • Mz • Pza • Txz) ......... 8 EG
  10. (Gy • Txy) ⊃ (∃z)(Lz • Mz • Pza • Txz) ......... 3-9 CP
  11. (y)[(Gy • Txy) ⊃ (∃z)(Lz • Mz • Pza • Txz)] ......... 10 UG
  12. (x)(y)[(Gy • Txy) ⊃ (∃z)(Lz • Mz • Pza • Txz)] ......... 11 UG

Wednesday, 25 May 2011

Symbolic Logic, D. Jacquette, Wadsworth, 2001, Chpt. 8, IV(17), p. 436

The argument:

"If Annie is elected, then everything we worked to achieve in the last 4 years will be destroyed. Either Annie or Sara will be elected. But it's definitely not going to be Sara. Whatever is destroyed must be rebuilt from scratch. Hence, everything we worked to achieve in the last 4 years must be rebuilt from scratch."

The proof:
  1. Ea ⊃(x)(Wx ⊃Dx)
  2. Ea ∨Es
  3. ¬ Es
  4. (x)(Dx ⊃ Rx)
  5. ∴(x)(Wx ⊃ Rx)
  6. Ea ......... 3,2 DS
  7. (x)(Wx ⊃Dx) ......... 6,1 MP
  8. Wx ⊃Dx ......... 7 UI x/x
  9. Dx ⊃ Rx ......... 4 UI x/x
  10. Wx ⊃ Rx ......... 8,9 HS
  11. (x)(Wx ⊃ Rx) ......... 10 UG

Thursday, 19 May 2011

Symbolic Logic, D. Jacquette, Wadsworth, 2001, Chpt. 8, IV(16), p. 435

The argument:

"All schnauzers are prize dogs and champion hunters if they are properly trained. Ralph is a schnauzer. Therefore, there is something that if properly trained is a champion hunter."

The proof:
  1. (x)[(Sx • Tx) ⊃(Px • Dx • Cx • Hx)]
  2. Sr
  3. (∃x)[Tx⊃(Cx • Hx)]
  4. * ¬ (∃x)[Tx⊃(Cx • Hx)] ......... AIP
  5. * (x) ¬ [Tx⊃(Cx • Hx)] ......... 4 QC
  6. * (x) ¬ [ ¬ Tx ∨(Cx • Hx)] ......... 5 MI
  7. * (x)[Tx • ¬ (Cx • Hx)] ......... 6 DeM
  8. * Tr • ¬ (Cr • Hr) ......... 7 UI
  9. * Tr ......... 8 Simp.
  10. * Sr • Tr ......... 2,9 Conj.
  11. * (Sr • Tr) ⊃(Pr • Dr • Cr • Hr) ......... 1 UI
  12. * Pr • Dr • Cr • Hr ......... 10,11 MP
  13. * ¬ (Cr • Hr) ......... 8 Simp.
  14. * ¬ Cr ∨ ¬ Hr ......... 13 DeM.
  15. * Cr ......... 12 Simp.
  16. * ¬ Hr ......... 15,14 DS
  17. * Hr ......... 12 Simp.
  18. * Hr • ¬ Hr ......... 16,17 Conj.
  19. ¬ ¬ (∃x)[Tx⊃(Cx • Hx)] ......... 4-18 IP
  20. (∃x)[Tx⊃(Cx • Hx)] ......... 19 DN

Wednesday, 11 May 2011

Symbolic Logic, D. Jacquette, Wadsworth, 2001, Chpt. 8, IV(15), p. 435

The argument:

"Something is costly and something is free. Something is prohibitively expensive only if nothing is free. As a result, nothing is prohibitively expensive."

The proof:
  1. (∃x)Cx • (∃x)Fx
  2. (∃x)(Px• Cx) ¬ (∃x)Fx
  3. ¬ (∃x)(Px• Cx)
  4. (∃x)Fx ......... 1 Simp.
  5. ¬ (∃x)(Px• Cx) ......... 4,2 MT

Thursday, 5 May 2011

Symbolic Logic, D. Jacquette, Wadsworth, 2001, Chpt. 8, IV(14), p.435

The argument:

"There are ghosts if and only if all ghosts or specters are just figments of the imagination. Something is just a figment of the imagination. But not everything fails to be a ghost. Therefore, some ghosts are just figments of the imagination."

The proof:
  1. (∃x)Gx ≡ (y)(z)[(Gy ∨Sz) ⊃(∃w)(Iw • Fyw • Fzw)]
  2. (∃x)(∃y)(Iy • Fxy)
  3. ¬ (x) ¬ Gx
  4. (∃x)[Gx • (∃y)(Iy • Fxy)]
  5. ¬ ¬ (∃x) Gx ......... 3 QC
  6. (∃x) Gx ......... 5 DN
  7. (y)(z)[(Gy ∨Sz) ⊃(∃w)(Iw • Fyw • Fzw)] ......... 6,1 MP
  8. Ga ......... 6 EI
  9. Ga ∨Sm ......... Add
  10. (z)(Ga ∨Sz) ⊃(∃w)(Iw • Faw • Fzw) ......... 7 UI y/a
  11. (Ga ∨Sm) ⊃(∃w)(Iw • Faw • Fmw) ......... 10 UI z/m
  12. (∃w)(Iw • Faw • Fmw) ......... 9,11 MP
  13. Ir • Far • Fmr ......... 12 EI w/r
  14. Ir • Far ......... 13 Simp.
  15. (∃y)(Iy • Fay) ......... 14 EG
  16. Ga • (∃y)(Iy • Fay) ......... 8,15 Conj.
  17. (∃x)[Gx • (∃y)(Iy • Fxy)] ......... 16 EG